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CAUTION, COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS, AND THE
ACTUAL STATE OF THINGS: A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR FLETCHER

Ezra Rosser*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Tribal governments considering entering into cooperative agreements with federal,
state, or local governments ought to maintain a healthy skepticism regarding the nontribal governments sitting across from them at the negotiating table. I believe that nontribal governments enter into such negotiations with assumptions and goals that are often
antagonistic to tribal interests; perhaps more importantly, a presumption that such
governments will not abuse cooperative agreements to the detriment of tribes does not
accord with the history of prior treaties and agreements. In a recent article, Michigan
State University Professor Matthew L.M. Fletcher presents a very different take on
cooperative agreements: he actively encourages tribes to pursue them as a way of getting
around the uncertainty of federal Indian law and avoiding a harsh judicial climate. 1 It2
would be foolish to overly criticize Fletcher's argument, both for self-interested reasons
and, more importantly, because the underlying idea--that tribes can benefit from
cooperation-has its own merits. That being said, I do believe that Indian communities
would be wise
to take Fletcher's one-sided celebration of cooperative agreements with a
3
grain of salt.
Cooperative agreements between tribes and non-tribal governments in many

* Assistant Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. M. Phil., University of
Cambridge, 2004; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2003; B.A., Yale University, 2000. The Author is Anglo.
I. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian Country, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=879808 (accessed Sept. 15, 2006). The paper posted on SSRN is a longer version of
the article published in 53 Fed. Law. 38 (Mar.-Apr. 2006); therefore, in the interest of fairness to Fletcher's
argument, this response will only reference the more developed version of the paper. All citations are to the

version found on SSRN.
2. Fletcher is one of the most prolific writers among pre-tenure Indian law professors. According to a
Lexis search, Fletcher has twelve solely authored Indian law articles (in addition to another article he
coauthored with his wife and fellow Indian law professor, Wenona T. Singel) that have been published within
the last four years. That search does not include many law review publications, such as the one being reviewed
in this response. Frankly, as I have noted to my wife, such hard work and dedication is a bit intimidating to a
more junior scholar, and, as a general policy, it seems wise for a fellow pre-tenure author to avoid criticizing
someone who has maintained such a productive pace.
3. This reply does not use Fletcher's article to incite disagreement; instead, the form of a reply was chosen
because his admirable article serves as a convenient foil to help present a more skeptical take on cooperative
agreements.
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respects are products of "the actual state of things ' 4 (ASOT) and, as such, reflect both
the positive and negative aspects of Indian law. Seen positively, tribal use of cooperative
agreements to make the best of their at-times precarious place within American
federalism represents the "staying power" of tribes and tribal governments described in
Professor Charles Wilkinson's Blood Struggle.5 This is the perspective presented by
Professor Fletcher. Yet, such cooperative agreements can also reflect an all-too-easy
assumption that ASOT should (1) inform the background starting points that tribes and
non-tribal governments bring with them to negotiations and (2) circumscribe the policy
choices available to tribes. As the heated exchange between Professors Robert Williams
and Robert Laurence makes clear, the "actual state of things" is a topic to be approached
with some trepidation. 6 However, considering the place of "the actual state of things"
helps bring into relief the differing perspectives on tribal powers today and on the tribal
lawyers who help define, create, or limit these powers.
Part II of this article briefly presents Fletcher's argument in favor of cooperative
agreements. Part III analyzes the relationship between cooperative agreements and
ASOT, using the presentation of ASOT by the two charter members of the Indian law
"[flight [c]lub" as a way of framing the analysis. 7 Part IV considers the dangers tribes
face when negotiating with non-tribal governments-those internal to the tribe and those
reflecting their negotiating counterpart. Finally, the conclusion briefly sketches some
principles that will help tribes get the most out of the cooperative agreement process and
its outcomes. As I hope will be clear by the end of this article, I share with Fletcher an
appreciation for the dynamic potential benefits of cooperative agreements; I am just less
optimistic about the goodwill, motives, and trustworthiness of non-tribal governments.
II.

FLETCHER'S ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS

Fletcher's article, Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian Country, presents an
analysis of tribal cooperative agreements that, while it contains a few cautionary asides,
is largely an advocacy piece for such agreements and, implicitly, for the foresight of

4. In Worcester v. Georgia,Chief Justice John Marshall introduced the "actual state of things" (ASOT) as
a guiding principle of Indian law, Marshall using it to justify superior European rights over land under the
principles of the doctrine of discovery. 31 U.S. 515, 560 (1832). For more on the doctrine of discovery,
review David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson & Robert A. Williams, Jr., Cases and Materials on Federal
Indian Law 41-71 (5th ed., West 2005); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal
Thought: The Discoursesof Conquest (Oxford U. Press 1990).
5. Charles Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations 383 (W.W. Norton & Co.
2005) (asserting that the Indian voice will in some forms endureforever).
6. See Robert Laurence, Learningto Live with the PlenaryPower ofCongress over the Indian Nations: An
Essay in Reaction to ProfessorWilliams' Algebra, 30 Ariz. L. Rev. 413 (1988) [hereinafter Laurence, Plenary
Power]; Robert Laurence, On Eurocentric Myopia, the Designated Hitter Rule and "The Actual State of
Things," 30 Ariz. L. Rev. 459 (1988) [hereinafter Laurence, Eurocentric Myopia]; Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence's Learning to Live with the
Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian Nations, 30 Ariz. L. Rev. 439 (1988) [hereinafter Williams,
Learning]; Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of FederalIndian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and
Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence,1986 Wis. L. Rev. 219 [hereinafter Williams, Algebra].
7. Professor John LaVelle used the Brad Pitt and Edward Norton movie, Fight Club, (Fox 1999) (motion
picture), as a memorable way of capturing the intensity of the academic back-and-forth contained in the articles
in note 6. John P. LaVelle, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty through Indian Participationin American
Politics:A Reply to ProfessorPorter, 10 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Policy 533, 534 (2000).
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those negotiating the agreements.
sections:

Fletcher divides his argument into the following

1. Overview of the Problem of Local Control in Indian Country
2. Federal Indian Law and the Decline of Tribal Bargaining Power
3. "Checkerboard" Jurisdictions
4.

The So-Called "Democratic Deficit"

5. The "Tyranny of the Favored Quarter" in Tribal-State Relations
6.

Local Tribal Control Favored by Congress and the Executive

7. The Utility of Intergovernmental Negotiation and Agreement
8. Political Barriers to the Intergovernmental Negotiation and Agreement
9. Conclusion
The article begins by describing the "broad array of services and issues" handled by
tribal governments 8 and then, in dramatic fashion, introduces cooperative agreements:
"[i]n the midst of the ruins
of federal Indian law have arisen intergovernmental
9
negotiation and agreements."
According to Fletcher, cooperative agreements have transformative powers. State,
local, and tribal government negotiation often leads to "unique and far-sighted solutions"
to shared problems.' 0 Moreover, the process of negotiating cooperative agreements
leads to continually improving agreements, thus "head[ing] off jurisdictional and
political disputes."'" The process and the executives involved ensure the best outcome:
"[o]ne successful agreement leads to more successful agreements. State and local
government and tribal executives have the best view of their own needs in these
numerous and disparate areas and can reach the best solutions, far better than the
judiciary or even the legislatures." 12 By "working with non-Indian governments," tribal
authority can be preserved and expanded, governmental services can be efficiently
provided, and non-Indians can
be reassured that they will be subjected to laws of the sort
13
they are comfortable with.
The challenges tribes face as a consequence of the U.S. Supreme Court's ad hoc
and largely antagonistic treatment of the powers of Indian tribes relative to the Court's
preference for non-Indian governments form the substance of sections two through five.
As Fletcher describes, the Court has created a "tyranny of the favored quarter," resulting
in "states and local governments [having] greater bargaining power over their tribal
government neighbors."' 4 Checkerboard areas help bring out tensions between tribes

8. Fletcher, supra n. 1,at 1.
9. Id.at 2.
10 Id.
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id.
13. Fletcher, supra n. 1,at 3.
14. Jd. at 4.
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and state or local governments, with regulatory and adjudicatory disputes arising
between the governments and the Court intervening to limit tribal powers over
nonmembers. 15 Fletcher continues "the Supreme Court has elevated state and local
governments and non-Indians over tribal governments,"' 16 both by favoring non-tribal
governments when state or local governments "conflict or compete with tribal
government authority" 17 and by finding implicit divesture of "numerous and
fundamental sovereign powers of Indian tribes."' 18 The Court's decisions "generate
increasing disputes amongst Indian tribes, nonmembers, and state and local
and leading to even
governments," creating inefficiencies in government service delivery
19
more "blunt" cutting across tribal powers by the federal judiciary.
The pattern of judicial opinions presented in Fletcher's sections two through five is
not the subject of this article. Indeed, most authors in the Indian law community would
generaally agree his presentation of the Court's treatment of Indian governmental
The description of the support that the executive branch and the U.S.
powers.
Congress have given tribal self-government and local tribal control over reservation
affairs, found in section four, is similarly uncontroversial. What is worthy of closer
scrutiny is the assertion that tribes can use intergovernmental agreements to "reduce or
eliminate altogether the uncertainty" created by federal Indian law, exercise "de facto"
sovereignty over checkerboard areas, and more efficiently provide government
services.21
In an article spiked with strong statements advocating cooperative agreements,
Fletcher highlights the difficulties facing cooperative agreements. For example, despite
his belief that a negotiation ending in an agreement "includes all the elements necessary

15. Id. at4-6.
16. Id. at 9.
17. Id.
18. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 10.
19. Id. at 10-11.
20. See e.g. Frank Pommersheim, Coyote Paradox: Some Indian Law Reflections from the Edge of the
Prairie,31 Anz. St. L.J. 439, 442 (1999) ("[C]oncern for history and doctrinal consistency has recently been
abandoned in favor of a series of historically superficial and intellectually deficient Supreme Court
pronouncements that have both curbed tribal authority and advanced state authority over non-Indians on nontrust land within Indian country." (footnote omitted)). The uncontroversial nature of Fletcher's summary is at
least partly captured by the long-standing nature of complaints, such as charges of ad hoc decision making in
the Court's treatment of tribal powers. See e.g. Curtis G. Berkey, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Bring New
Confusion to the Law of Indian Sovereignty, in Rethinking Indian Law 77, 79 (Nail. Laws. Guild ed., Advocate
Press 1982) ("It is apparent that the Court has not carefully constructed a theory of Indian sovereignty nor does
it cite rules and principles as controlling precedents .... The Court's language regarding Indian sovereignty is
perhaps more correctly regarded as mere explanations or justifications of the result, rather than hard and fast
rules which the Court feels bound to follow.").
21. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 14 (emphasis added). In some respects, Fletcher's argument echoes the
implication of a 1996 article that, while predominantly an overview of increasing judicial disfavor of inherent
tribal sovereignty, ends by suggesting that tribes seek out cooperative agreements with states. See L. Scott
Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 901-02 (1996).
Professor L. Scott Gould says that his article does not "propose a panacea" to the limitations on tribal inherent
powers; however, by ending the paper with cooperative agreements, there is some implication that these
agreements can have a transformative role. Id. at 901. Uncertainty regarding judicial outcome can motivate
states, as well as tribes, to negotiate cooperative agreements rather than risk adverse, costly judgments.
Intergovernmental Compacts in Native American Law: Models for Expanded Usage, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 922,
933 (1999); Joel H. Mack & Gwyn Goodson Timms, Cooperative Agreements: Government-to-Government
Relations to FosterReservation Business Development, 20 Pepp. L. Rev. 1295, 1305-06 (1993).
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to meet and resolve the Court's concerns," he acknowledges that "[t]he Court has not yet
passed on whether a state or local government can agree to bind its non-Indian
constituents to tribal ... jurisdiction." 22 Likewise, he acknowledges the limited success
in negotiating and solving ongoing disputes between tribes and neighboring non-Indian
governments. 23 As he aptly states, "[t]he long history of animosity and distrust between
Indians and non-Indians continues to bar the door toward cooperation." 24 Yet, he
sweeps these difficulties aside with ease, observing that they are mere "political
barriers." 25 Fletcher concludes the paper by arguing that, in these times of governmental
devolution, tribes ought to seek out intergovernmental agreements because tribes, states,
and local governments have much to gain from such agreements.
To Fletcher's credit, his advocacy in Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian
Country is not only unflinchingly unapologetic about eagerly accepting negotiated
sovereignty as appropriate for tribes, 26 but is also consistent with his support of Indian
attorneys. Given the leading role Indian lawyers play in negotiating cooperative
agreements, how Indian lawyers are seen goes hand-in-hand with how cooperative
agreements are seen. He argues "Indian lawyers remain amongst the most progressive,
cutting edge lawyers to this day '27 because
Indian lawyers are quick to recognize cultural and political strengths and limitations; they
are quick to recognize political and sociological advantages and disadvantages to big
picture tribal decisions. Professors Porter and Vicente decry the "concessions" made by
these Indian lawyers, but the days
of making pie-in-the-sky arguments in federal
28
court-and winning-are behind us.
What is interesting in Fletcher's description is the lack of qualifiers: Indian lawyers
as a class are insightful and bright, and they do a good job making hard decisions that
reflect reality rather than the falsely idealized world of academics. The remaining
question is whether tribal lawyers, aware as they are of the background limitations on
arguments that the judiciary will accept regarding tribal power, should see cooperative
agreements as he seems to-as a panacea to the Court's treatment of exercises of tribal
power. Put differently, should the approach tribal lawyers take to cooperative
agreements include heightened respect to pie-in-the-sky arguments and demonstrate
greater concern for the possibility that cooperative agreements might too lightly concede
elements of tribal sovereignty?

22. Fletcher, supra n. 1,at 15.
23. Id. at 16.
24. Id. (footnote omitted). In particular, Fletcher describes the relationship problems that come from state
and local governments believing that they must compete with tribes for economic development. Id. at 16-17.
25. Id. at 17.
26. NegotiatedSovereignty is the title of a recent book on tribal-state relations. Jeffrey S. Ashley & Secody
J. Hubbard, Negotiated Sovereignty: Working to Improve Tribal-State Relations (Praeger 2004). The
motivation for this reply is not Fletcher's attention to the negotiated aspects of tribal sovereignty; rather, I am
concerned that his eagerness to applaud intergovemmental agreements leaves the reader with an unbalanced
understanding of such agreements.
27. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Dibakonigowin: Indian Lawyer as Abductee, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=820365, at 21 (2006).
28. Id.
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The conflict between policies that emphasize realism regarding the relationship
between tribes and non-Indian governments and approaches that prioritize ideal forms of
this relationship necessarily informs the consideration of whether cooperative
agreements should be as stridently advocated as they are by Fletcher. Ultimately, my
critique of Fletcher's position might boil down to a different take on how much we agree
with Williams' idealism compared with Laurence's willingness to accept greater
limitations on tribal sovereignty. While, as I will argue in Part IV, there is more to my
reaction than simply my having been taught Indian law by Williams-I seem to find
non-Indian governments much less trustworthy-it does seem that Fletcher has an
implicitly different perspective on the role that ASOT ought to play in the thinking of
Indian policy makers who are considering cooperative agreements.
Laurence has argued that acceptance of Congress' plenary power over Indians
coupled with "work to control the exercise of [this power]" helps create a healthier and
more stable Indian law.2 9 Although Laurence observed later that saying he could "live
with" plenary power was not the same as actually defending it, 30 his article established
that he would be understood as defending a perspective on tribal power that allowed
for-even accepted-the notion that tribal power could rightly be circumscribed as it is
through the plenary power doctrine. 3 1 The concluding analysis used by Laurence in
reaction to Williams' argument, 32 which favors a more expansive notion of tribal
sovereignty, relies upon ASOT to urge the acceptance of ideas33premised on the notion
that tribal powers should be viewed through the eyes of a realist.
Laurence insists that in Indian law: "[wie are talking here about 'the actual state
of things. -34 Though he agrees with Williams that "[t]he more modem view is the
correct one: war and strength ought not determine legal rights," he stresses that he agrees
with Chief Justice Marshall that Indian law must proceed from ASOT. 35 Laurence
explains that the relationship model advocated by Williams-in which neither Indians
nor non-Indians try to "steer the other's vessel"--is a model "that, were we to start from
the beginning, would be worthy of pursuit."36 However, he then asserts that, given
ASOT, this model is not workable. 37 Congressional plenary power is acceptable to
Laurence because he feels that the legal system will recognize tribal sovereignty together
with plenary power or will "not recognize tribal sovereignty at all." 3 8 This feeling takes

29. Laurence, PlenaryPower, supra n. 6, at 426.
30. Robert Laurence, Indian-Law Scholarship and Tribal Survival: A Short Essay, Prompted by a Long
Footnote,27 Am. Indian L. Rev. 503, 503 (2002-2003).
31. Laurence, Plenary Power, supra n. 6. As Laurence observes, he "received no particular outpouring of
friendly scholarly support" for this position. Laurence, supra n. 30, at 504.
32. Williams, Algebra, supra n. 6.
33. Laurence, PlenaryPower, supra n. 6, at 435-37.
34. Id. at 435 (emphasis in original).
at 436.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 436-37 (using colorful imagery of "aircraft carriers and super-tankers" swamping an Indian canoe
to reject Williams' treaty model of the two row wampum in which the Indian canoe and a separate ship for
white people travel the same river without interfering with each other).
37. Id.
38. Laurence, Plenary Power, supra n. 6, at 437. Laurence's take-the-good-with-the-bad mentality reflects
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ASOT as a starting point, not only for how the past is considered but also for the present
39
powers associated with sovereign tribes.
The similarity between the thinking of Laurence and Chief Justice Marshall is
apparent in Worcester v. Georgia, the decision Laurence highlights at the beginning of
his section on ASOT. 4 1 Though Marshall's opinion obscures the point, the Worcester
Court made the choice not only to describe the conquest of Indian tribes but also to
circumscribe the powers of tribes. Another option was available to Marshall: the past
could have been noted and simultaneously a prescriptive judgment entered that
affirmatively discontinued the wrongs of the past.42 Instead, Marshall accepted ASOT
as the proper starting point for understanding Indian rights and by so doing arguably
helped legitimize the takings of Indian land that characterized the next one hundred
years, from the remainder of the treaty period to the end of allotment. In form at least,
Laurence's argument mirrors Marshall's: ASOT is the starting point for an understanding
of Indian law that justifies limiting tribal sovereignty. Even the ex ante hope is the
44
same, 43 a hope that miraculously the future will not reflect the past.
Williams' reactionary attack on the idea that ASOT properly constrains tribal
sovereignty (by the acceptance of congressional plenary power) is harshly delivered; one
can almost imagine Laurence grunting in pain with the escalation of the intensity of the
pairing between these members of the fight club.4 5 Williams writes "Professor Laurence
is one of those 'things as they are' people I guess. I'm a foolish idealist. I'm a 'things as
they've never been' person. ' 6 Ouch! Williams punches again and again:
I can only take comfort from the fact that Uncle Tom's Cabin was written despite the
"actual state of things" (the ASOT), Rosa Parks rode where she damn well wanted to ride
despite the ASOT, Cesar Chavez passed around union cards despite the ASOT, Sitting Bull
fought the Seventh Cavalry despite the ASOT, the Passamaquodies demanded Maine back
despite the ASOT, Cromwell and the Puritans plotted to overthrow a King's divine right
and then chopped off his head despite the ASOT, and a bunch of radical exiles from the
Norman Yoke got together in Philadelphia in 1776 and declared their independence from
an Old World despot despite the ASOT. They all refused to learn to live with the "actual
state of things; " so too, Indian tribal people must refuse to learn to live with the
Eurocentric myopia of a vision which cannot see beyond the actual state of things in

his ability to "support a doctrine whose roots [he] disrespect[s]." Id.at 422.
39. See Williams, Learning,supra n. 6, at 444 (describing Laurence's perspective as being to "build ...
upon the mistakes of the past as we leap forward, full of faith").
40. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
41. Laurence, PlenaryPower, supra n. 6, at 435.
42. Such, for example, is the form of Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which
described the wrongs of segregated education and ordered desegregation.
43. See Williams, Learning, supra n. 6, at 444 (describing Laurence's hope as one which "springs eternal"
for a future, improved version of the plenary power).
44. Laurence does not, of course, see this as being miraculous, for though he acknowledges that he is "not
much more than four generations beyond John Marshall's Cherokee decisions," he finds "optimism in the
history of the Indian Civil Rights Act." Laurence, Plenary Power,supra n. 6, at 422, 426.
45. In the final return jab of the Williams-Laurence debate, Laurence acknowledges as much: Williams'
closing argument made him "squirm" and he was "not entirely comfortable" with the possibility that he might
be happy with the status quo. Laurence, Eurocentric Myopia, supra n. 6, at 460.
46. Williams, Learning, supra n. 6, at 457.
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47

FederalIndian law.

Double ouch! When you consider Williams' earlier observation that both
Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. did not bow down to ASOT, 4 8 it is clear
that, after this reaction, a little animosity might develop between Williams and
Laurence. 49 Underlying Williams' idealism is the belief that tribes do not necessarily
have to concede elements of their sovereignty simply because of long-standing legal
principles or ASOT in the relationship between Indians and non-Indians. Or perhaps
more accurately, he believes that tribes should work against an ASOT that urges
50
acceptance of diminished self-determination.
The Williams-Laurence exchange is an Indian law version of the classic conflict
between pragmatism and realism on the one hand and revolutionary idealism on the
other. As such, it provides an excellent window into considerations of tribal cooperative
agreements. While Fletcher does not explicitly pick a side in either Reviving Local
Tribal Control or Dibakonigowin, he ultimately seems to come down on the side of
giving pragmatic advice to tribal governments. In advocating cooperative agreements,
Fletcher's only explicit mention of ASOT is used purely descriptively to describe what
the Court does when considering Indian law cases. 5 1 By rejecting "pie-in-the-sky
52
arguments," he seems to reveal his own impatience with Williams-esque idealism.
Fletcher's rejection of such arguments echoes the lengthy block quote from Sam Deloria
included at the start of Dibakonigowin; the quote criticizes "Indian academics who
basically yearn for a time which never existed, when Indian sovereignty was like
Superman in a universe without kryptonite." 53 Fletcher includes this quote without
much commentary. However, the final section of the block quote reads as a barely
disguised implicit attack, just as pointed as the Williams-Laurence debate, on academics
who share some of Williams' views: "we have scholars that want to look over the state
of the law and come back and say, 'Hey, we've got unlimited sovereignty, it's just that
we've got a screwed up country that won't recognize it.' Well, that's helpful." 54 Read
side by side--one a defense of the role of Indian lawyers, the other an advocacy piece for
urge lawyering on the behalf of tribes within
cooperative agreements-Fletcher's articles
55
ASOT.
the
by
defined
space
legal
the

47. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 456-57.
49. Given the heated nature of the exchange, such animosity might even slip over to uninvolved professors
who self-identify as being more in agreement with one or the other fight club member.
50. Williams, Learning, supra n. 6, at 457.
51. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 8.
52. Fletcher, supra n. 27, at 21.
53. Id. at 3 (quoting Sam Deloria, Commentary on Nation-Building: The Future of Indian Nations, 34 Ariz.
St. L.J. 55, 55 (2002)).
54. Id. at 4 (quoting Sam Deloria, Commentary on Nation-Building: The Future of Indian Nations, 34 Ariz.
St. L.J. 55, 56 (2002)). While Williams is not explicitly identified, he is one of the leading intellectuals
implicated by Sam Deloria's criticism.
55. This claim is perhaps too incendiary. As Professor Kevin Washburn writes, "[a]cross the wide range of
academic commentary on American Indian policy, it is difficult to find any scholar who is fully satisfied with
the 'actual state of things' in Indian country today." Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the
Crossroads, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 777, 782 (2006) (footnote omitted). It is probably more accurate to say that
Fletcher seems pragmatically able to accept ASOT.
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Cooperative agreements are attractive for Indian law advocates who favor a
realistic approach-one acknowledging ASOT--to tribal sovereignty because, as
Fletcher highlights, offering a way around a harsh judiciary arguably enables tribal
action. 56 According to Laurence, "[a] jurisprudence that recognizes the 'actual state of
things' is one less likely to be confined to theoretical obscurity and, I think, more likely
to get things done." 57 The role of ASOT in cooperative agreements is perhaps best
captured by the quote that opens NegotiatedSovereignty: "A new policy and institutional
framework for state-tribal relations must be developed that is cognizant of previous
58
policy and legal rulings as well as the current reality of Indian self-determination.
According to this statement, ASOT is a requisite for state-tribal relations that must take
into account both prior legal precedent and the current reality.
For the moment, let us consider how cooperative agreements can, given ASOT,
provide tribes with an expanded ability to accomplish their goals. Cooperative
agreements can (1) help tribes avoid jurisdictional contests with non-Indian
governments; (2) provide additional funding for tribal government services and
government agencies; and (3) help resolve recurring problems that cross tribal-state
boundaries.
Jurisdictional disputes limit the effectiveness of criminal and civil
regulation. In the best of cases, such disputes make policing and regulation more
difficult and costly, while, in the worst, they completely prevent such oversight.
Cooperative agreements, on everything from the mundane (e.g., building codes) to the
fundamental (e.g., police protection), can limit the problems caused by jurisdictional
disputes. 59 For tribes with limited budgets, cooperative agreements can also bring
needed money to deal with the problem being addressed by the agreement and, through
provision for overhead expenses, to expand the size of the tribal government. Finally,
many challenges faced by tribes--air pollution is a classic example-have by their very
nature a cross-border aspect that accordingly warrants a cooperative agreement. 60 Tribes
and non-Indian governments face such cross-border challenges in much the same way
that pollution in Arizona can affect Mexico and vice versa. Notice that these potential
benefits exist now, and, while this article is in response to Fletcher and therefore I am
emphasizing the concerns I have with such agreements, I share with Fletcher an

56. Review supra notes 14 to 26 and accompanying text. See e.g. Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of
Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 Or. L. Rev. 1109, 1172 (2004)
("Unlike states, tribes cannot market tax exemptions in order to lure customers into their jurisdictions. The tax
rate in Indian country for non-Indians will therefore always be set at a floor of the state tax rate. On the other
hand, the Navajo Nation has approached state governments in order to address the problem of multiple taxation
on a government-to-government level. Through tribal and state legislation as well as intergovernmental
agreements, the Navajo Nation has been able to mitigate some of the harsher effects of the Supreme Court's
multiple taxation cases." (footnote omitted)).
57. Laurence, EurocentricMyopia, supra n. 6, at 462.
58. Ashley & Hubbard, supra n. 26, at 3 (quoting Council of State Governments).
59. See e.g. Ezra Rosser, Rural Housing and Code Enforcement: Navigating between Values and Housing
Types, 13 Geo. J. Pov. L. & Policy 33 (2006).
60. See Ashley & Hubbard, supra n. 26, at 9 ("As public goods, resources such as air and water are shared
by all in a geographical area and know no jurisdictional boundaries. Thus, the problem of nonappropriability
and a sense of responsibility from one government to another in providing for clean air and water dictate
cooperation among governmental jurisdictions."); Richard A. Du Bey, Mervyn T. Tano & Grant D. Parker,
Protectionof the Reservation Environment: Hazardous Waste Management on Indian Lands, 18 Envtl. L. 449,
477-78 (1988) (discussing tribal-state spillover pollution).
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61

awareness and appreciationfor these benefits.
These are all valid reasons to support cooperative agreements; however, Williams'
"foolish idealis[m]" cautions against chaining tribal policy to a mechanism whose very
power comes from the limitations that ASOT places on other, more independent
exercises of tribal sovereignty. 62 Cooperative agreements implicitly recognize the
interests non-Indian governments have in what happens on the reservation. In addition,
63
recognizing these interests in the negotiation process arguably legitimizes them.
Similarly, while tribes might be able to expand their government through federal grants
associated with cooperative agreements, the size and power of tribal governments thus
become dependent on the continued willingness of non-Indian governments to negotiate
favorably and the existence of such grant streams, raising questions about the
appropriateness of advocating such agreements. 64 Finally, even where cross-border
problems might otherwise provide valid motivation for cooperative agreements,
agreements negotiated by tribal leaders encouraged to think that idealism is impossible
will be negotiated from a wrongly weak position. As a consequence, the resulting
agreement is likely to invite undue non-Indian involvement in the life of the reservation
under the false assumption that nothing better was possible.
Care is needed to prevent imposing an exaggerated typology of the WilliamsLaurence positions upon an analysis of cooperative agreements. An argument can be
made that a weak form of Williams' analysis would not in fact be as resistant to
cooperative agreements as it is presented in the preceding paragraph. The leaders
identified by Williams who changed history by not accepting ASOT managed to do so
primarily by resisting ASOT, but at times they doubtlessly did use those aspects of
existing norms or laws that furthered their respective causes. To the degree that
cooperative agreements represent a creative break with the history of racism and false
primacy of European notions of what is right,6 5 Williams is likely to support them.

61. For a more extensive description of the benefits of negotiated solutions, review Intergovernmental
Compacts, supra n. 21, at 929-31.
62. Williams, Learning, supra n. 6, at 457; but see Krakoff, supra n. 56, at 1194 (arguing "to act as
governments, tribes must also constantly negotiate their legal status with the federal government and, at times,
state governments" (emphasis added)).
63. These features weigh against blanket statements such as "[c]ooperative agreements, by their very nature
as intergovernmental agreements, enhance tribal sovereignty." Mack & Timms, supra n. 21, at 1306.
Consistent with their unconditional support, the article is primarily a practitioner's guide to making cooperative
agreements. Id. at 1310-38.
64. Insecurity in finding must be weighed against the non-financial advantageous elements of negotiated
agreements: "[e]ven where cooperative agreements prove, on balance, beneficial to tribes, it may be difficult to
sustain them if state funding falters, liability issues strain relations, or mutual fear or mistrust make them
politically controversial." Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is PublicLaw 280 Fitfor the Twenty-First
Century? Some Data at Last, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 697, 728-29 (2006) (discussing law enforcement agreements).
Because "[t]ribes often lack resources to implement a complex regulatory scheme," cooperative agreements
whose end result is complexity funded by external grants risk overextending tribes should funding levels
diminish. Mack & Timms, supra n. 21, at 1301 (noting that lack of resources can limit the ability of tribes to
claim interests as legitimate). Similarly, although written in a discussion of the plenary power, Professor Sarah
Krakoff's concern raised in the following question is even more applicable where a tribe arguably seeks out
such a relationship through cooperative agreements: "[w]hat kind of sovereignty can it be that depends, for its
continued existence, on the pleasure of a branch of government of another nation?" Krakoff, supra n. 56, at
1119.
65. See Williams, Algebra, supra n. 6, at 274 ("Tribal nations, by a neo-feudalistic grant of 'diminished
status' within the dominant culture's political and legal hierarchy, are placed within a highly rationalized and
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However, because cooperative agreements are negotiated in the context of a legal system
that accepts the diminished sovereignty of tribes, they end up incorporating the
weakened position of tribes into the final agreement. 66 As such, rejecting "pie-in-thesky" arguments and advocating cooperative agreements do not seem to accord with the
strong form of Williams' approach, which is not so conciliatory toward the overarching
legal framework applied to tribes.
Similarly, even if one accepts ASOT as a starting point for Indian tribal leaders,
cooperative agreements are perhaps not worthy of the uncritical support Fletcher seems
to give them. An ASOT jurisprudence, Laurence argues, can be used "to promote
change, not to oppose it. ' 67 While so far the focus has been on the close relationship
that potentially exists between accepting the role of ASOT and advocating cooperative
agreements, Laurence's statement, by itself, does not argue for or against advocating
cooperative agreements. If one believes that there is still a lot of work to be done before
"Indian tribes [are] accepted by our nation as something a good deal more than private
voluntary organizations," 68 then a position discouraging exaggerated reliance on
cooperative agreements as a panacea for challenges faced by tribes can be consistent
with an acceptance of the role of ASOT. As Laurence observes, "[n]one of ihis is to
69
suggest that all of us 'actual state of things' thinkers will agree on what that 'state' is."
Thus, while Fletcher's pragmatic vision might argue for cooperative agreements, another
ASOT thinker can just as appropriately think that now is a time to hold off on many
cooperative agreements and instead believe that tribes should concentrate their energies
on other, perhaps more independent governance policies. As was true when considering
Williams' perspective, here too a strong version of Laurence's defense of ASOT does
seem to lean towards one view of cooperative agreements: in the case of Laurence and
Fletcher, who favor a realistic and pragmatic approach that incorporates ASOT,
cooperative agreements seem worthy of general support.
IV.

DANGERS TRIBES FACE WHEN NEGOTIATING WITH NON-TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS

Despite the many benefits to tribes that can accompany cooperative agreements,
the effects of such agreements on tribal sovereignty suggest that a more conditional
approach to cooperative agreements is appropriate. Unconditional approval of tribal

legitimating framework that concedes limited recognition to the Indian's self-defining vision. That vision is
recognized, however, only as long as the tribes' desires are consistent with the interests, expressed or implied,
of the European-derived vision of the superior sovereign.").
66. Williams argues that, in order to navigate the game of federal Indian law, tribes are forced to limit the
difference between their form of governance and the non-Indian norms:
The winning strategy of this game, therefore, dictates erasing those aspects of difference which
might deny an identity with the interests of the absolute sovereign. To win this game defined by
European-derived legal discourse, the Indian must make himself a supplement to this discourse's
own lack of fullness, and fulfill its desire for plentitude and transcendence by denying the full
presence of his own vision.
Id. at 286 (footnote omitted). Cooperative agreements arguably represent the most developed form of this selfdenial, with tribal governments deliberately negotiating the form of their sovereignty with non-Indian
governments.
67. Laurence, EurocentricMyopia, supra n. 6, at 462 (emphasis in original).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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cooperative agreements must confront the effect cooperative agreements can have on
internal tribal priorities and on the involvement of tribal members in fundamental
decisions of the tribe, as well as the history of the Indian experience with non-Indian
governments. It bears repeating that the purpose of this section is not to disparage all
cooperative agreements but to cast doubt on Fletcher's claim that cooperative agreements
70
might "eliminate altogether" uncertainty in federal Indian law.
A.

Internal

Tribal governments with a policy of embracing the benefits of cooperative
agreements risk having their tribal priorities determined by non-Indian governments and
perhaps elevating decision making of tribal technocrats (including attorneys) above the
tribal political process.
As Professor Frank Pommersheim correctly notes, for
indigenous groups "[n]either [assimilation nor isolation]-in their purist form-is
tenable in a modem, interdependent world., 7 1 While Fletcher undoubtedly agrees with
Pommersheim, I am afraid that there will not be sufficient recognition of the possible
corruptive effects of these agreements upon tribal governance if tribal leaders accept his
overly optimistic stance on cooperative agreements.
In negotiating cooperative agreements, tribes often compromise their sovereign
ability to determine tribal priorities. A distinction must be drawn between tribes
choosing to assume control of government services that had been provided by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs or other government agencies and negotiated cooperative agreements
because, when true negotiation is required, tribes do not have a right to non-Indian
agreement. In many circumstances, the compromises of cooperative agreements may be
necessary: Professor Kevin Washburn argues that, in general, though "[m]ilitant and
inflexible assertions of tribal sovereignty may be emotionally satisfying .
a flexible
72
and more practical approach may sometimes be useful.,
In some respects, Washburn's advice to tribes mirrors Fletcher's. According to
Washburn, tribes should "identify and climb aboard the public policy initiatives
today ...

that can also benefit Indian tribes." 73

In addition to applying for general

applicability grants, hopping aboard Washburn's train will, in practice, often mean
negotiating cooperative agreements. Before we conclude that these two professors are
giving tribes the same advice, it is important to note that Washburn is careful to highlight
the role of tribes in identifying beneficial policies and to describe a practical approach as
sometimes being useful. This difference in the advice given to tribal leaders is important
because it preserves the possibility of independent tribal prioritization of policies. If
Fletcher's support of cooperative agreements is actually conditional and his paper simply
did not contain all of his qualifiers, I agree with it. If that is the case, then this article is
not so much a reply as an effort--necessary I believe-to highlight the importance of
those qualifiers. I agree that cooperative agreements can sometimes be a good strategy

70.
71.
72.
73.

Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 14. Review supra notes 10 to 23 and accompanying text.
Pommersheim, supra n. 20, at 448-49.
Washburn, supran. 55, at 791 (emphasis added).
Id. at 793.
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for tribes to pursue. The practices and experiences of the Navajo Nation with regard to
cooperative agreements highlight the problematic elements of these agreements as they
affect internal tribal governance.
The Navajo Nation has successfully signed numerous memorandums of
understanding on water quality with Arizona, but has been unable to get past
jurisdictional disputes with New Mexico and hence has not been able to negotiate similar
agreements with New Mexico. 74 As a result, these agreements cover only part of the
Navajo Nation despite the fact that "[u]nlike many of the smaller tribes, the Navajo
Nation is a formidable force." 75 There are promising signs that the tribal cooperative
agreements do reflect tribal priorities and actual cooperation; for example, Professor
Jeffrey Ashley and Secody Hubbard report the Navajo Nation "is much more willing to
76
enter into a mutual agreement when they are convinced that it will, in fact, be mutual.",
Thus, "[w]hile many Navajo officials likely believe that the best long-term solutions are
clear territorial boundaries and increased funding and autonomy for the Nation to
provide its own services, that day is not at hand,"77 and tribal officials are pursuing some
cooperative strategies in the meantime.
But that is not the end of the story. Navajo tribal members and even attorneys
trying to find out what cooperative agreements the tribe has made will have a hard time
compiling a list-such a task is hard even for tribal attorneys. Despite the fact that many
of the tribe's cooperative agreements permit non-Indian governments to determine the
nature of Navajo government services-for example, deciding the degree to which
environmental hazards need to be cleaned up or helping to establish standards applied to
the emissions of on-reservation businesses---there is no central database of such
agreements. By not having information on such agreements readily available to the
public, the Navajo Nation limits the degree to which individual tribal members have a
voice in agreeing to or rejecting negotiated agreements. The success the Navajo Nation
has had negotiating with Arizona through technocrats 78 similarly reflects a diminished
voice of tribal members, including the expression of that voice through elected
representatives. The technocratic strategy of negotiation leads to more finalized
agreements: "cooperation (thus coming to terms on the fundamentals of an agreement) is
much greater at the lower, technical levels, and ... discussions tend to disintegrate when
79
they become politicized.,
The mere fact that Indian and non-Indian governments reach agreement should not
cloud judgment regarding whether the finalized agreement was a success from a process
or practical standpoint. The elevation of technocratic negotiation downplays the
relationship between single agreements and the larger questions implicated by such
agreements. 80 This is especially true in the aggregate: seemingly singular agreements

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Ashley & Hubbard, supra n. 26, at 61.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 66.
Krakoff, supra n. 56, at 1147 (footnote omitted).
Ashley & Hubbard, supra n. 26, at 66.
Id. at 124.
Id. (recommending that, "[w]hen possible, negotiations should focus on a single, narrow topic").
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can together span the range of tribal government services. While involvement of
politicians may make reaching agreement more of a challenge, perhaps a cautionary and
more politicized approach that focuses more on jurisdiction is appropriate when the
aggregate effect of such agreements upon tribal governance is significant. Finally, the
outcome of cooperative agreements may say much more about non-Indian priorities than
tribal interests. Who, for example, is in the driving seat on cooperative tax agreements
where the rate agreed upon brings the rate to exactly the off-reservation rate? 8 1 Along
both policy prioritization and political process grounds, there are reasons to resist an
exaggerated understanding of the power and promise of cooperative agreements.
B.

History

Indian people have no reason to trust non-Indian governments. While it is
important to be very careful in making historical claims regarding non-Indian treatment
of Indian people, 82 it is not an exaggeration to describe this treatment as genocide.
Professor Rennard Strickland writes:
I want us to address the reality of the American Continents as a sacred
survival and the decimation of a people and their culture. We must face
hemisphere is the tragic "killing fields" resulting in aboriginal genocide
This is the thing not spoken, not acknowledged, not even hinted at in the
myth.

site of both the
the fact that this
and culturecide.
larger American

The facts are clear and incontrovertible. The introduction to the three-volume history
Violence in America dramatically describes the magnitude of this human disaster: the near
annihilation of the Western hemisphere's Native people during the four centuries following
Christopher Columbus' voyages, constitutes the most massive eradication in the history of
the world.
The staggering figure of lost lives is projected by major scholars as at least one hundred
million people. The current demographic analysis suggests that "as researchers calculate
the cause of depopulation, the conclusion that will inevitably be reached is that between 97

81. See Krakoff, supra n. 56, at 1173. Krakoff concludes that "regarding dual taxation, the Navajo Nation
has reached out to the surrounding states and negotiated with them as a sovereign to achieve a mutually
beneficial economic solution." Id. at 1199. Yet, as she explained earlier in the same article, "[t]he Navajo
Nation's response can only go so far, however. The Court's concurrent taxation cases have virtually eliminated
the possibility that tribes could use competitive tax policies to attract non-Indian businesses onto the
reservation." Id. at 1174 (footnote omitted).
82. The investigation of Professor Ward Churchill, author of A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and
Denial in the Americas 1492 to the Present (City Lights Bks. 1997), reveals the importance of making sure all
claims are properly documented and not exaggerated. See Report of the Investigative Committee of the
Standing Committee on Research Misconduct at the University of Colorado at Boulder Concerning Allegations
of Academic Misconduct against Professor Ward Churchill, http://www.colorado.edu/news/reports/churchillU
download/WardChurchillReport.pdf (May 9, 2006); see also John P. LaVelle, The General Allotment Act
"Eligibility" Hoax: Distortions of Law, Policy, and History in Derogation of Indian Tribes, 14 Wicazo Sa.
Rev. 251 (1999) (available at http://Iawschool.unm.edu/faculty/lavelle/allotment-act.pdf (accessed Sept. 15,
2006)); John LaVelle, Review Essay: Indians Are Us? 20 Am. Indian Q. 109 (1996) (available at
http://lawschool.unm.edu/faculty/lavelle/american-indian-quarterly.pdf (accessed Sept. 15, 2006)).
The
Churchill investigation and probable dismissal from a tenured position arguably underscore just how important
history is in Indian law: "any attempt to understand federal Indian law must be grounded in a full appreciation
of the history of federal Indian policy." Robert N. Clinton, Carole E. Goldberg & Rebecca Tsosie, American
Indian Law: Native Nations and the FederalSystem 19 (4th ed., Lexis 2003).
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and 98 percent of North and South America's 1492 population was wiped out by postColumbian holocaust." This means83 that only two to three percent of the aboriginal
population of the Americas survived.
Similarly, Fletcher states "[t]he genocide perpetrated on Indian people is unprecedented
in world history in terms of its continuity." 84 The relationship between non-Indians and
Indians is also defined by at times voluntary, but often forced, land transfers from
85
Indians to non-Indians.
The present role of this ignoble history (albeit a history still being written 86 ) in the
relationship between Indians and non-Indians cannot be overstated. While it took
Dances with Wolves 87 to remind a new generation of Americans of Indian suffering,
"[e]very Indian and Indian tribe knows the story of their decimation. ' 88 Ashley and
Hubbard observe in their book on intergovernmental negotiations that "[o]vercoming this
history is not easy!" 8 9 And I believe it should not be easy to overcome. Even if the selfdetermination era is an era in which U.S. policy warrants Indian trust in non-Indian
governments-itself a highly debatable proposition--this period reflects a mere blip on
the centuries of mistreatment of Indians at the hands of non-Indian governments. To
90
borrow from Justice William Johnson's concurrence in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
whether the heightened respect for Indian governments-begun with President Nixon's
1970 Special Message to Congress 91 and continued through successive legislation 92 and
executive orders, 93 -"can be yet said to have received the consistency which entitles"

83. Rennard Strickland, Things Not Spoken: The Burial of Native American History, Law and Culture, 13
St. Thomas L. Rev. 11, 11-12 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
84. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Sawnawgezewog: "'TheIndian Problem "and the Lost Art of Survival, 28 Am.
Indian L. Rev. 35, 39 (2003-2004) (footnote omitted).
85. The nature of the conquest of Indian land, premised on a claimed European right to land occupied by
Indians, is described by Chief Justice John Marshall in Worcester, 31 U.S. at 580 (acknowledging "conquest"
as the root of U.S. rights over Indian tribes), and in Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (defending
the doctrine of discovery being incorporated into the U.S. legal structure). Conquest occurred not only through
military operations but also through legal structures that transferred land out of tribal hands. See e.g. Cohen's
Handbook of Federal Indian Law 6 (2005 ed., LexisNexis) (describing the "legal" character of the significant
loss of land experienced by Indian tribes); Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 1314 (1995) (describing the land loss that resulted from the allotment policy of opening up, after Indians were
granted individual allotments, the "surplus lands" to non-Indians).
86. The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision to deny an Indian tribe the power to reform their reservation
through private market purchases within the land area originally reserved, based on a theory of laches, forms
the most recent legal mechanism by which the Indian land base has been reduced. City of Sherrill v. Oneida
Indian Nation ofN.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 202-03 (2005). For reactions to the case, review Amy Borgman, Student
Author, Stamping Out the Embers of Tribal Sovereignty: City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation and Its
Aftermath, 10 Great Plains Nat. Resources J. 59 (2006); Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title,
Possessionand Sacred Obligations,38 Conn. L.Rev. 605 (2006).
87. (MGM 1990) (Motion Picture).
88. Strickland, supra n. 83, at 13.
89. Ashley & Hubbard, supra n. 26, at 121.
90. 30 U.S. 1.
91. Richard Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs, 1970 Pub. Papers 564-67, 576 (key sections
available at http://www.epa.gov/indian/pdfs/nixon70.pdf (accessed Sept. 15, 2006)). For more on the selfdetermination era, review Clinton, Goldberg & Tsosie, supra n. 82, at 41-48 (discussing an era of selfdetermination from 1962 to 1980 and an era of "[g]ovemment-to-[g]ovemment [r]elations and [d]ecreases in
ff]ederal Indian [p]rogram [flunding" from 1980 to the present).
92. E.g. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203
(1975).
93. E.g. Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, Exec. Or. 13175, 65 Fed. Reg.
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non-Indian governments to the trust and respect of Indians "is, I conceive, yet to be
94
determined."
Tribes can negotiate cooperative agreements even when they do not trust the nonIndian governments at the negotiating table; however, the blanket advocacy of such
agreements rejects the idea that what Indians really need to negotiate from non-Indians is
a "leave-us-alone agreement." 95 As argued by the late Professor Vine Deloria, Jr. in his
highly influential manifesto, the leave-us-alone agreement has as central components an
awareness of the role that caution regarding non-Indians has played in maintaining a
unique Indian identity in the face of tremendous non-Indian pressure, as well as an
appropriate concern for the harmful effects of non-Indian involvement in Indian life.96
As Deloria eloquently explains, the U.S. government, and, by proxy, state governments
are not and should not be trusted by Indians:
In looking back at the centuries of broken treaties, it is clear that the United States
never intended to keep any of its promises. Like other areas of life, the federal government
adapted its policies to the expediency of the moment....
Indian people have become extremely wary of promises made by the federal
government. The past has shown them that even the most innocent-looking proposal is
97
often fraught with implications the sum total of which is loss of land.

Much has changed since Deloria wrote these words. However, given the long
history of contact-a history that is still being written to the detriment of Indian
rights 9 -with non-Indians, the wariness of Indian people continues to be justified. 9 9
What troubles me is not that Fletcher does not spend more time bringing out the

nature of the history of animosity between Indians and non-Indians; rather, it is that the
solution to this history that Fletcher proposes is almost a truism.

The way out of the

history of animosity Fletcher offers is simple: "[t]hese barriers are political barriers.
Nothing stops Indian tribes and non-Indian governments from negotiation and entering

67249 (Nov. 9, 2000) (available at http://web.em.doe.gov/ftplink/public/exordl3l75.pdf (accessed Sept. 15,
2006)). American Indian Executive Orders from 1994 to the present are available at http://web.em.doe.
gov/public/tribal/orders.html (accessed Sept. 23, 2006).
94. 30 U.S. at 21 (Johnson, J., concurring).
95. Vine Deloria, Jr., Custer Diedfor Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto 27 (repr., U. Okla. Press 1988).
96. Deloria pays particular attention to academics and religious missionaries. Id.at 78-124. For more on
the role of tradition in maintaining tnbal identity among the Navajo, review Ezra Rosser, This Land Is My
Land, This LandIs Your Land: Markets and Institutionsfor Economic Development on Native American Land,
47 Ariz. L. Rev. 245, 298 (2005).
97. Deloria, supra n. 95, at 48-49.
98. For a recent land taking example, review UN Economic & Social Council, Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Indigenous Peoples and Minorities: Indigenous Peoples and Their
Relationship to Land 20-21 (Working Paper E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21, June 11,2001) (detailing the continuing
U.S. efforts to take Western Shoshone land and the criticism such efforts have received from international
human rights organizations) (available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/GO1/141/79/PDF/
GO 114179.pdfOpenElement).
99. For example, one author argues that New York's interest in cleaning up hazardous waste on the St.
Regis Mohawk reservation "should be viewed with skepticism... [and] historical caution." Peter D. Lepsch,
A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Is New York State's Move to Cleanup the Akwesasne Reservation an Endeavor to
Assert Authority over Indian Tribes? 8 Alb. L. Envtl. Outlook J. 65, 70 (2002). Lepsch justifies his skepticism
by observing that "[t]here are few instances in American jurisprudence when state interests in protecting tribal
peoples are wholly benevolent." Id. (footnote omitted).
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into agreements."' 10 0 Unfortunately, it seems to me that political barriers are significant
barriers that, considering the history of relations with non-Indians, are difficult to
overcome. If we imagine a world without political barriers to tribes, we could imagine
10 1
our way out most of the challenges facing Indian people and their tribal governments.
V.

CONCLUSION

In navigating their relationships with non-Indian governments, tribal governments
must make difficult choices that, in many circumstances, ought to include serious
consideration of the costs and benefits of cooperative agreements with non-Indian
governments. Both pragmatic necessities based on short-term challenges to tribal
governance and visions of a future, richer sovereignty may "require tribes to strive for
cooperative agreements with their traditional enemies."' 102 But to get the most out of
cooperative agreements, tribes should, to the degree to which they have a choice, focus
on those agreement types that best accord with an ambitious understanding of tribal
sovereignty. The types of agreement that both Laurence and Williams seem to accept as
advantageous for tribes provide a good foundation for beginning to describe the ideal
agreement type. With such agreement types--reflecting both a strong version of tribal
independence and a simultaneous awareness of the pragmatic necessities tribes
face---tribes might confidently pursue cooperative agreements with some hope for a
good result despite all the reasons to approach negotiations with skepticism.
The exercise of merely describing a cooperative agreement negotiation experience
and extrapolating the type of agreements to be sought is not particularly valuable. Not
only would such an effort fail to capture the different needs of different
tribes---recognizing these differences is something that, I argued elsewhere, needs to
occur to a greater extent in Indian law scholarship 03-- but it would also be hopelessly
time-sensitive even for the tribe or tribes whose agreements were being celebrated. To
illustrate, a Harvard Law Review Note identifies several "substantive areas ... ripe to
10 4
capture many of the benefits of [cooperative agreements] while avoiding its pitfalls."'
The Harvard Note holds up agreements regarding alcohol sale agreements, road
maintenance, education, and environmental regulation as areas with the potential for
beneficial tribal-state agreement. 1° 5 Commentators have advocated adding many other

100. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 17.
101. We could, for example, imagine Congress willing to use, one hundred percent of the time, its plenary
power in support of, and not to the detriment of, tribes. Without political barriers, the executive branches
might strive to live up to U.S. trust obligations, and, if they failed to do so, political pressure would be brought
to bear to ensure that new executives would be found who did seek to create the sort of U.S.-tribal relationship
reflective of the dreams of Indian law professors. For an example of one Indian law professor imagining Indian
law in a world without political barriers to the realization of Indian goals, review Robert Laurence, A
Memorandum to the Class, in Which the Teacher Is Finally PinnedDown and Forcedto Divulge His Thoughts
on What Indian Law Should Be, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 1 (1993).
102. Gould, supra n. 21, at 901.
103. Ezra Rosser, Ambiguity and the Academic: The Dangerous Attraction of Pan-Indian Legal Analysis,
119 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 141 (2006) (available at http:/lwww.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issuesll 19/dec05/
rosser.pdf (accessed Sept. 15, 2006)).
104. IntergovernmentalCompacts, supra n. 21, at 935.
105. Id.
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substantive areas to this list, including child support, 10 6 law enforcement and criminal
jurisdiction, 107 management of traditional lands, 10 8 economic development, 1 09 and even
landfill location.I1 0 Despite the many areas where cooperative agreements may further
tribal policies and be acceptable to even the most tribal-independence-oriented advocate
or scholar, tribes should bear in mind this qualifier on cooperative agreements: "[tihe
success of negotiated settlements nevertheless depends upon a realization that they are
not suitable for all claims [or issues], and do not always ensure equality of bargaining
11
power." '

106. Danelle J. Daugherty, Student Author, ChildrenAre Sacred: Looking beyond Best Interests of the Child
to EstablishEffective Tribal-State Cooperative Child Support Advocacy Agreements in South Dakota, 47 S.D.
L. Rev. 282, 307-14 (2002).
107. Emma Garrison,Baffling Distinctions between Criminal and Regulatory: How Public Law 280 Allows
Vague Notions of State Policy to Trump TribalSovereignty, 8 J. Gender, Race & Just. 449, 474-78 (2004).
108. Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict between the "Public Trust" and the "Indian Trust" Doctrines: Federal
Public Land Policy and Native Nations, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 271, 309-10 (2003) (discussing management of nonreservation parklands by a neighboring tribe).
109. Lorie Graham, Securing Economic Sovereignty through Agreement, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 523, 537
(2003) (noting that cooperative agreements "can enhance a tribe's ability to pursue a more cohesive economic
strategy"); see also Crystal K. Glendon, Student Author, A PoliticalSolutionfor a Legacy under Attack: The
Akaka Bill's PotentialEffect on the Kamehameha Schools, 26 Hawaii L. Rev. 69, 95-96 (2003) (advocating a
cooperative agreement to safeguard the revenues from the Kamehameha land trust for the benefit of Native
Hawai'ians).
110. Jana L. Walker & Kevin Gover, Commercial Solid and Hazardous Waste DisposalProjects on Indian
Lands, 10 Yale J. on Reg. 229, 250 (1993) (written by attorneys-Kevin Gover is now a law professor at
Arizona State University-who at the time represented the Campo Band of Mission Indians, a tribe seeking to
locate a solid waste disposal site on tribal land for waste from Southern California cities); see also Dan
McGovern, Excerpts from The Campo Indian Landfill War: The Fight for Gold in California's Garbage, 14
Stan. Envtl. L.J. 375, 395-98 (1995) (reporting on the support of the Campos and non-Indian officials for a
negotiated agreement).
111. IntergovernmentalCompacts, supra n. 21, at 939.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol42/iss1/5

18

